Farnborough Airport: Halcrow 'independent' advice

... at the end of the day, this is a political process ... if people are unhappy then the politicians will be held accountable at the ballot box. -- Richard Short, former Rushmoor planning official

As a result of a High Court case (Parkins v Rushmoor) Rushmoor were obliged to seek 'independent advice' on airport safety.

To date, two flawed reports have been submitted by ERM, a company with a reputation for applying greenwash to flawed projects, eg Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey.

Now enter Halcrow. Halcrow have undertaken a review of previous work. Halcrow have not themselves submitted any original work, merely a commentary on what has gone before.

The Halcrow report itself forms part of a report to Rushmoor planning committee, to which it is attached as an annexe (Appendix D).

• http://www.rushmoor.gov.uk/council/ci13ac.htm

The advice has to be independent.

Halcrow have been and still are the lead consultants advising DfT on the future of aviation in the south east.

Halcrow have conducted a report on business aviation for what was DTLR, now DfT, they also advised on business aviation, they are also currently engaged in providing advice. In their report on business aviation, Halcrow stated there was no third party risk at Farnborough!

• http://www2.aviation.dft.gov.uk/aviation/consult/airconsult/se/technical/findings/pdf/ss2achapter13.pdf

Halcrow independent?

Halcrow have not independently verified either the crash rates used or the models. Halcrow note the large discrepancy between the work by ERM and Nats. No explanation.

Halcrow quite correctly state that drawing risk contours takes no account of the population on the ground. They also note that in reaching a planning decision Rushmoor has to take account of the population on the ground.

Perversely Halcrow seem to believe it is difficult to address ground safety. It is not. Exactly the same inputs - crash rates, number of movements, aircraft mix, aircraft weight, crash consequence area - as used to draw individual risk contours.

To date, no study of ground safety has taken place.

Drawing annual individual risk contours has only two uses: determining a PSZ, determining the exposure to 1:10,000 risk.

Halcrow quite correctly state the level of risk of 1:10,000 is at the upper limit of tolerable third party risk (and cite HSE recommendations), and that the risk should not extend beyond the airfield boundary.

The 1:10,000 annual individual risk contour extends beyond the airfield boundary at the western end. This is a favourite spot for fisherman on the Basingstoke Canal to congregate.

Condition 16 is thus not acceptable and must be REJECTED.

The only use of the 1:100,000 annual individual risk contour is for the purpose of drawing a PSZ. A PSZ is a future planning tool, it cannot be used to determine this application.

A PSZ, public safety zone, is a sanitised zone within which people should not live, work or congregate. It is drawn for the number of movements in 15 years hence, ie not the number of movements now or TAG's planning limit of 28,000 movements. TAG are currently in the process of supplying DfT with their estimates for movements in 15 years hence to enable a PSZ to be drawn.

What we can say is that the 1:100,000 annual individual risk contour at Farnborough encloses more people, ie more people at risk of being killed, than at any other UK airport.

	Heathrow	2200
	Gatwick		   2
	Farnborough	3500

Condition 17 is thus not acceptable and must be REJECTED.

Drawing annual individual risk contours does not constitute a ground safety study as no account is taken of the population on the ground.

In their submission to the High Court, Rushmoor admitted that no safety study had been carried out. They stated a safety study would be carried out when they considered conditions 16 & 17.

Rushmoor in contempt of court?

In the planning agenda (10 February 2003) reference is made to various reports. To date, not counting this report, I have submitted three reports. Not a single one is referenced.

The claimed, widespread consultation has not taken place. The previous planning meeting (December 2002) did not consider the reports placed before the committee, it only considered the resolutions to defer a decision (the minutes of the December 2002 planning meeting are a false record of what actually took place).

The planning agenda (10 February 2003) notes extensive work TAG has carried out. This was for the purpose of obtaining a CAA civil licence and has no relevance for the determination of a land use planning application.

These are just further examples of the biased and corrupt nature of the planning department at Rushmoor. An in-depth, independent investigation is long overdue.

At the beginning of January 2003, TAG Aviation were granted a Civil Licence by CAA to operate Farnborough as a civil airport.

Under Section 35 of the Civil Aviation Act, TAG are under a statutory duty to establish a mechanism for consultation, usually in the form of a consultative committee to provide a forum within which all interested affected parties can discuss and hopefully resolve airfield issues. To date TAG have refused to discharge their statutory obligations and establish a consultative committee.

On Wednesday 5 February 2003, TAG Aviation held a ceremony for the formal opening of Farnborough Airport.

Planning consent a foregone conclusion?

Planning documents

• http://www.rushmoor.gov.uk/council/ci13ac.htm